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Linda Hogan
Human Rights and the Ethics of Peace:  
The Contribution of Pacem in Terris
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag setzt sich mit der Bedeutung der Menschenrechte in der Christlichen Sozi-
alethik auseinander und benennt Herausforderungen, die mit der Rezeption der Enzy-
klika Pacem in terris verbunden sind. In einem ersten Schritt werden die politischen und 
theologischen Kontexte der Entstehung der Enzyklika beleuchtet. Anschließend wird 
diskutiert, auf welche Weise Pacem in terris die Sprachformen christlichen Sozialenga-
gements transformierte und dabei – trotz des seit langer Zeit bestehenden Verdachtes 
des Lehramtes gegen die Kategorie der Menschenrechte – für die Menschenrechte 
plädierte. Dann wird die These entwickelt, dass das Hauptverdienst von Pacem in terris 
in der Verbindung von Menschenrechtspolitik und Friedenspolitik für die Christliche 
Sozialethik bestand. Schließlich werden herausfordernde Aspekte der Rezeption dieser 
innovativen und bedeutenden Enzyklika diskutiert.
Abstract
This paper reflects on the significance of human rights in Christian social ethics and 
considers the challenges associated with the reception of the encyclical. In a first step, 
it provides an analysis of the political and theological contexts from which Pacem in terris 
emerged. It then discusses how Pacem in terris has transformed the language of Christian 
social commitment and promoted human rights notwithstanding the tradition’s long-
standing suspicion of the category of human rights. It suggests that one of the most 
important contributions wrought by Pacem in terris was the manner in which it brought 
the politics of human rights and the politics of peace into a seamless Christian social 
ethic and it ends with a discussion of the challenges associated with the reception of 
this transformative and iconic encyclical.
Human rights represent one of the great civilizing projects of modernity. 
From their formal promulgation in Paris in 1948 in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, to their subsequent embrace by the newly independent 
states from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, human rights have emerged 
as the primary discourse of global politics and as an increasingly prominent 
category in international and domestic legal systems. In the theological realm 
the concept of human rights has all but replaced its antecedent, the natural 
right, while in the world of Christian social engagement the language of 
human rights has become the lingua franca of political and social action.
The 50th anniversary of Pacem in terris provides an opportunity to 
reflect on the significance of human rights in Christian social ethics and 
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to consider the challenges associated with the reception of the encyclical. 
This paper begins with an analysis of the political and theological con­
texts from which Pacem in terris emerged. It goes on to discuss how the 
encyclical transformed the language of Christian social engagement and 
promoted human rights notwithstanding the tradition’s longstanding 
suspicion of the category of human rights. It suggests that one of the 
most important contributions wrought by Pacem in terris was the man­
ner in which it brought the politics of human rights and the politics of 
peace into a seamless Christian social ethic and it ends with a discussion 
of the challenges associated with the reception of this transformative 
and iconic encyclical.
The promulgation of Pacem in terris happened at the height of the 
Cold War. Although the Cold War was to continue for further decades, 
the years immediately preceding the issuing of the encyclical were par­
ticularly tense. In October 1962 the Cuban missile crisis grabbed the 
imagination of the world and led to the widespread fear that nuclear 
weapons would be used. Although the threat never materialized, the crisis 
left an indelible mark on the consciousness of the global polity, it was 
the first time that there was worldwide recognition that humanity had 
come perilously close to annihilation, and that the powers of destruc­
tion were in its own hands.
Pope John XXIII addressed this directly in his encyclical saying that 
“there is a common belief that under modern conditions peace cannot be 
assured except on the basis of an equal balance of armaments and that 
[…] if one country is equipped with atomic weapons, others consider 
themselves justified in producing such weapons themselves, equal in 
destructive force” (PT 110). “Consequently”, he says, “people are  living 
in the grip of constant fear. They are afraid that at any moment the 
impending storm may break upon them with horrific violence” (ibid. 111). 
Yet he insists that “justice, right reason, and the recognition of man’s dig­
nity cry out insistently for a cessation to the arms race.” And reiterating 
the words of Pope Pius XII he reminds the world that “the calamity of 
a world war, with the economic and social ruin and the moral excesses 
and dissolution that accompany it, must not on any account be permit­
ted to engulf the human race for a third time” (ibid. 59).
Pacem in terris is an iconic and important encyclical. It marks a signifi­
cant breakthrough in the social ethics tradition since it is the first time 
that the language of human rights is explicitly used in a papal encycli­
cal. Moreover it is also important because it establishes a threshold of 
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engagement with the world that is qualitatively different than earlier 
encyclicals: In Pacem in terris Pope John XXIII addresses and challenges 
global political leaders in a language that is both comprehensible to the 
world, and that simultaneously draws on Christian theological categories, 
and uses a language which is also embedded in the tradition’s historic 
memory and its social witness.
It begins: “Peace on earth, which all men of every era have most eagerly 
yearned for, can be firmly established only if the order laid down by God 
be dutifully observed” (ibid. 1; accent. by L. H.).
And in a carefully constructed analysis and argument, it goes on to 
consider
  • the rights of human beings and their corresponding duties;
  • the relationship between the citizen and state, and in particular the 
nature of the authority of the state;
  • the need for equality amongst nations and the responsibilities of states 
to live by the same rights and duties that are attendant on individuals;
  • the need for better relationships between nations states and for a global 
civil society based on mutual respect and mutual aid.
The richness of the encyclical is evident for all to read, and there are 
many aspects on which one could fruitfully comment. The task today 
however is to discuss its importance for Christian social ethics specifi­
cally in relation to the politics of human rights.
1  Pacem in Terris and the Language of Human Rights
All traditions, whether they are secular or religious, are dynamic and 
evolving. Traditions are the products of discursive processes, they are his­
torically constructed and internally diverse. The historian John  Noonan 
(cf. 1993, 669) characterizes some aspects of the Catholic Church’s moral 
tradition in this way: what was forbidden became lawful (the cases 
of usury and marriage); what was permissible became unlawful (the 
case of slavery); what was required became forbidden (the persecution 
of heretics).
So whether one examines the Roman Catholic Church’s tradition on 
marriage, on divorce, on abortion, on slavery, on conscientious objec­
tion to war or on religious freedom one encounters an always evolving, 
sometimes inconsistent, and occasionally contradictory body of thought. 
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This is the case also with Christianity’s engagement with the notion of 
human rights. Historical studies confirm that there has long been signifi­
cant internal diversity on the matter of whether human rights language 
has any place in the Christian vocabulary.
In recent decades the Roman Catholic Church has enthusiastically 
adopted the language of human rights. The language of human rights 
is pervasive throughout the teaching and practice of Catholic social eth­
ics today and is frequently the idiom through which Christian values 
are articulated to the modern world. Moreover the Catholic Church, 
through its organisational structures has played a key advocacy role in 
terms of promoting human rights in national and international contexts. 
Across the world national conferences of Catholic bishops pursue social 
justice concerns through the lens of human rights and this is also repli­
cated at the inter­governmental and international level. For example the 
Catholic Commission of Bishops’ Conferences of the European Com­
munity (COMECE), made a formal response to the Draft Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in which they confirmed that 
“protecting the fundamental rights of citizens in relation to the Euro­
pean Union, its institutions and its agencies is an important initiative 
to which  COMECE attaches great value” (COMECE 2000).
However it has not always been thus. Although the Roman Catholic 
Church now uses the language of human rights consistently in its politi­
cal and social ethics, there was a time when it too expressed hostility 
to the modern concept of human rights. Not only did Pius VI declare 
that it was anathema for Catholics to accept the 1789 Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, saying “this equality, this liberty, so 
highly exalted by the National Assembly, have then as their only result 
the overthrow of the Catholic religion”,1 but Gregory XVI’s 1832 encyclical 
Mirari vos also strongly condemned liberalism, individualism, democracy, 
and also freedom of conscience, of speech, and of the press. The histo­
rical details of the progressive adoption of human rights by the Catholic 
Church are well understood and will not be repeated here. However, it 
is important in the context of assessing the significance of Pacem in terris 
to note that this encyclical marked one of the most seminal moments in 
the Catholic tradition’s journey from its initial hostility towards human 
rights language to its enthusiastic embrace.
1 Quoted in Plongeron 1979.
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Pacem in terris begins by linking the human desire for peace with the 
creation of a just and ordered society and highlights the obligations 
human beings have to use the progress of learning and the inventions 
of technology in the pursuit of this purpose. Immediately it articulates 
the foundational principle of any well­ordered society, and insists that 
it rests on the understanding “that every human being is a person, that 
is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will” (PT 9). And 
explicitly referencing Pius XII’s Christmas Eve radio message of 1942 
the encyclical goes on to insist that it is “precisely because he is a person 
he has rights and obligations flowing directly and simultaneously from 
his very nature” and that furthermore “these rights and obligations are 
universal and inviolable so they cannot in any way be surrendered” (ibid. 
9). Thus fundamental rights flow from the person’s nature, and, universal, 
inviolable, and therefore inalienable. Pacem in terris goes on to enumerate 
the substantive content of these inviolable and inalienable rights, in a 
very extensive and detailed manner. Amongst the fundamental human 
rights that are identified are “the right to life, to bodily integrity, and to 
the means which are suitable for the proper development of life; these 
are primarily food, clothing, shelter, rest, medical care, and finally the 
necessary social services” (ibid. 11). Arising from this moreover “human 
being also has the right to security in cases of sickness, inability to work, 
widowhood, old age, unemployment, or in any other case in which he is 
deprived of the means of subsistence through no fault of his own” (ibid.). 
In addition to these basic human rights the encyclical goes on to enu­
merate the political and cultural rights to which human beings can lay 
claim. Thus “every human being has the right to respect for his person, 
to his good reputation; the right to freedom in searching for truth and 
in expressing and communicating his opinions, and in pursuit of art, 
within the limits laid down by the moral order and the common good; 
and he has the right to be informed truthfully about public events” (ibid. 
12). In this context too there is recognition of the supreme importance of 
the right to religious freedom, the right to practice one’s religion publicly 
and privately, and in the words of the encyclical “to honor God accor­
ding to the sincere dictates of [one’s] own conscience” (ibid. 14). There 
is also the right to share in the benefits of culture, and hence to receive 
a good general education (cf. ibid. 13), the right to choose for oneself 
the kind of life which appeals to the person (cf. ibid. 15).
In terms of the evolution of the Catholic tradition of human rights 
Pacem in terris makes a significant contribution to the enunciation of 
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economic rights as human rights. From the late nineteenth century 
onwards, and especially after the promulgation of Rerum novarum in 1891, 
the church frequently spoke about economic rights, and particularly high­
lighted the rights of workers to safe and sustainable working conditions 
and to fair wages (cf. RN 34). With Pacem in terris however economic 
rights become articulated as human rights, and as fundamental to the 
just ordering of society. Pacem in terris locates these rights in the natural 
law, and speaks not only about the right to an opportunity to work, but 
also to be able to work “without coercion” (PT 18). Reasonable working 
conditions are mentioned as a right, and this is given substance by the 
way in which the encyclical insists on the right to working conditions in 
which “physical health is not endangered, morals are safeguarded, and 
young people’s normal development is not impaired” (ibid. 19). Moreover, 
there is special mention of the “right to a wage determined according to 
criterions of justice, and sufficient, therefore, in proportion to the avail­
able resources, to give the worker and his family a standard of living in 
keeping with the dignity of the human person” (ibid. 20). In addition, 
while the right to the private ownership of property, is explicitly noted, 
it is also recognised in the encyclical that the right to own private prop­
erty entails a social obligation as well.
There is a remarkable consistency between the rights enumerated in 
Pacem in terris and those enumerated in the 1948 UN Universal Decla­
ration of Human Rights. Of particular interest is the manner in which 
Pacem in terris foregrounds economic and cultural rights, in addition 
to political rights, therefore giving support to those who argued for the 
inclusion of economic and cultural rights in the UN Declaration. The 
inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the UN Declaration 
was hard won and strongly resisted by the western powers. It was par­
ticularly the countries in the Latin American socialist tradition, together 
with the USSR and later the former colonies who really pushed for the 
inclusion and retention of these rights in the Declaration. Economic, 
social and cultural rights made their way into the Declaration initially 
because they were included both in the Inter­American text and in the 
Panamanian submission, both of which served as blue­prints for the first 
draft of the Declaration. They were retained because of the vigilance 
of the same delegates as well as on the insistence of China (cf. Morsink 
1999, 191ff.).
It is clear especially from the debates during the Third Session of 
the Commission that the idea of individuals being entitled to socially 
Linda Hogan
49
provided goods, services and opportunities such as food, shelter, health­
care, ‘social security’ and education represented a significant challenge 
to the conventional western conceptualisation of rights. Although dele­
gates from the USA and Britain reluctantly accepted their inclusion in 
the Declaration, they continued to regard these rights as having lesser 
status than civil and political rights. The fact that Pacem in terris took 
such a strong position on the equal importance of economic, social and 
political rights, while the international community was trying to bro­
ker an agreement on this (through the establishment of the different 
 covenants which gave a legal force to these rights) was very important. 
It allowed the emerging human rights regime to move away from a 
discourse dominated by civil and political rights and towards a human 
rights discourse that has, over time transformed this standard liberal 
category into a multicultural discourse with which, and through which, 
different moral languages and narrative traditions, including religious 
ones, readily engage.
2  Pacem in Terris and the Re-valorisation  
of the Historic Tradition of Rights
The fluency and confidence with which Pacem in terris deployed the 
language of human rights is hugely significant in terms of what it says 
about how the modern category of human rights should be regarded in 
relation to its theological antecedents. As we know for many decades the 
dominant view among theologians and philosophers was that the emer­
gence of liberalism should be regarded as something startlingly new.2 
However, this view has been modified significantly within the last two 
decades, not least because of the impetus given to the alternative point 
of view by Pacem in terris.
The historical studies of Roger Ruston (2004), Brian Tierney (1997) 
and John Witte Jr. (2007) in particular have challenged this assessment 
in respect of human rights, and have provided the basis for a new history 
2 See in particular Leo Strauss 1952; 1953. Strauss argued that the enlightenment 
philosophers beginning with Hobbes and Locke were the first to use the term 
‘natural right’. See also the work of Michel Villey for whom the concept of subjec­
tive rights constituted a revolutionary idea that developed from the voluntarism 
of William of Ockham. See in particular Villey 1964. See also Kamenka 1978.
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of rights in which the enduring significance of its Christian antecedents 
is acknowledged. Much of the debate about the appropriation of human 
rights language in Christian social ethics revolves around the question of 
the extent to which original theological meanings have persisted contem­
porary human rights discourse. Alasdair MacIntyre claims, for example, 
that “there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly 
translated by our expression ‘a right’ until near the close of the middle 
ages: the concept lacks any means of expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin 
or Arabic, classical or medieval, before about 1400” (1981, 69). However, 
Brian Tierney’s analysis of the jurisprudence of the twelfth century seems 
to contradict this conclusion, and refutes the view that human rights are 
a modern invention imposed on Christian political thought. According 
to Tierney the early medieval discussions about natural rights repre­
sent a thoroughly theological foreshadowing of the concept of human 
rights. Tierney’s discussion centres on the point at which ius naturale, 
which traditionally meant cosmic harmony or objective justice, began 
also to acquire the sense of a subjective natural right (cf. Tierney 1997, 
43 – 77). He remarks that the context of the evolving interpretation was 
a medieval society that was “saturated with a concern for rights” (ibid., 
57), and this undoubtedly influenced academic jurisprudence. Tierney 
assembles a host of textual sources that reveal how important individual 
subjective rights were to the canonists. Even Gratian wrote “of the rights 
of liberty that could never be lost, no matter how long a man was in 
bondage” (ibid., 57).3 Moreover in the discussions of whether the poor 
have a natural right to the superfluous goods of the rich we find the 
articulation of a subjective natural right in the form of a welfare right, 
thereby contradicting Cranston’s influential argument that rights of reci­
pience were unknown even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
(cf. Cranston 1962).
Though there is a host of different discussions each with its specific 
emphasis, Tierney discerns a clear progression from the idea that a rich 
man has an obligation to share his superfluities with the poor, to the 
eventual articulation of a right to the material necessities of life.  Alanus, 
Laurentius and later Vincentius Hispanus, for example, each used the 
language of right to refer to the poor man’s claim. Later Godfrey of 
3 Quoting Decretum Gratiani … una cum glossis (Venice, 1600), C. 16 q. 3 dictum 
post c. 15.
Linda Hogan
51
Fontaines wrote of this right as inalienable. “By law of nature (ius natu-
rae) each one has a certain right (ius) in the common exterior goods of 
this world, which right cannot be licitly renounced” he claimed (ibid., 
75).4 Many of the canonists also insisted that the procedure of evangeli­
cal denunciation should be available to the poor person in need. In this 
way the local “bishop could then compel an intransigent rich man to 
give alms from his superfluities, on pain of excommunication if neces­
sary” (ibid., 74). Nor was this purely a passive right because in the case 
of necessity the canonists recognised that the poor had a right to take 
what they needed. Evangelical denunciation thus became a means by 
which this right was justiciable, a remarkable accomplishment given 
that we are still struggling today to find ways to achieve justiciability in 
relation to welfare rights.
So what is the significance of this ambiguous legacy for Christianity’s 
engagement with contemporary human rights discourse? That there was 
evolution in the concept of natural rights between the medieval and early 
modern period is not disputed. What continues to be debated however 
is its significance for the theological appropriation of rights­talk. The 
loss of the theological horizon, together with an entrenchment of the 
secularism that has attempted to relegate religion to the private sphere, 
has led some to conclude that Christianity and liberalism now represent 
two incompatible ways of conceptualising human social relationships. 
Pacem in terris suggests otherwise. Moreover much recent historical work 
suggests that, in different historical periods, a theological language of 
rights was generated from within the life of the Christian community 
and was articulated in response to questions about the nature of Chris­
tian witness in the social context. The medieval canonists, the early Cal­
vinists and the Spanish Dominican reformers of the sixteenth century 
each moved effortlessly between the language of rights and the language 
of biblical texts and saw no conflict in so doing. Rights language was 
thus an indigenous theological language. It flourished within a religious 
world­view and expressed a fundamental theological belief about human 
beings as social creatures in a divinely providential universe. It was in effect 
deeply and incontrovertibly Christian. Nor was it a case that once the 
voluntarist interpretation took hold that it was the only frame through 
4 Quoting Hoffmans, J. (ed.) (1932): Les Quodlibets onze­quatorze de Godefried 
de Fontaines. Louvain: Editions de L’Institut supérieur de philosophie.
Human Rights and the Ethics of Peace: The Contribution of Pacem in Terris
52
which rights language was refracted. For example Tierney (cf. 1997, 340) 
mentions Pufendorf, Locke, Burlamaqui and Wolff as thinkers in whom 
traces of this theological frame were still evident and who moderated the 
sceptical tenor of the emerging liberal rights theories. Indeed particularly 
in Locke one can discern the continuing significance of the Christian 
tradition of rights, even though he is often mistakenly perceived as “a 
prototype liberal individualist” (Ruston 2004, 215).5
These early affinities together with a myriad of albeit fragile conti­
nuities, account for the ease and fluency with which Christians in the 
twentieth century re­appropriated the discourse of rights. Indeed one 
could argue, that the re­appropriation promoted by Pacem in terris not 
only has a historical warrant, but that it can be interpreted as the elabo­
ration, not the abandonment, of a theological tradition. Thus, although 
the language of historic memory, of faithful witness and of moral vir­
tue is often invoked by Christian communitarians to indicate a conflict 
with liberal, including human rights categories, I suggest that, at least 
historically, this situated memory, witness and virtue can also be read 
as facilitating a more positive mode of engagement.
3 Human Rights and the Ethics of Peace:  
The Untapped Legacy of Pacem in Terris
The legacy of Pacem in terris is secure in many important respects. The 
language of human rights is embedded in the language of Catholic 
social ethics and has become the mode of engagement internationally 
on critical social issues. In addition Catholic NGOs which essentially 
developed from Pacem in terris, Vatican II, and Populorum progressio, 
have given further force to human rights as important political social 
and legal categories on which to draw in pursuit of social justice. How­
ever gaps remain. We are highly aware of the shocking gaps in terms of 
rights and responsibilities in the institutional structures of the church. 
However there is another gap which I would like to consider, and it 
5 See Ruston (2004) chapters 11 – 15 in particular for a comprehensive rebuttal of 
this view that Locke was the prototypical liberal individualist. Ruston traces the 
dominance of this interpretation, especially in the American academy to Strauss. 
See note 135.
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relates to the failure to link substantially the politics of human rights 
with the politics of peace.
Pacem in terris made a highly significant intervention in relation to the 
politics of peace, and it is one which has not been given the attention 
it deserves. It is well acknowledged that the question of whether Chris­
tians should ever have recourse to war has been debated from the earliest 
centuries of Christianity. Moreover it is accepted that for the first three 
centuries Christians followed Jesus’ prophetic denunciation of violence 
and adopted what we now call a pacifist stance. However, as Christianity 
was legitimized and became ever more closely associated with the civil 
authority (initially with Constantine in the fourth century), it began to 
re­consider the absolutist pacifist position and developed a set of prin­
ciples that would allow for the defence of the innocent against unjust 
aggression in certain restricted circumstances. Thus began the just war 
tradition, initially developed by Ambrose and Augustine, and later elab­
orated by Aquinas, Vitoria and Suárez, and which quickly eclipsed the 
pacifist trajectory of the early church. Moreover the emergence, between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, of specific churches that were 
committed to a principled pacifism further distanced the major denomi­
nations, including the Roman Catholic Church, from pacifism, so that 
the just war tradition became the primary way that the church engaged 
with this question.
By the time Pope John XXIII addressed the issue of modern warfare the 
landscape had changed significantly and there was a growing recognition 
that the atomic capabilities of states raise new questions about the ethical 
acceptability of recourse to war as a means of righting wrongs, inclu­
ding wrongs associated with violations of human rights. This  represents 
a major moment in the history of Catholic thinking on war and peace, 
since it signals a degree of unease with the predominance of the just 
war paradigm, and it is particularly notable when Pacem in terris asserts 
that “it is contrary to reason to hold that war is a suitable way to restore 
rights which have been violated” (PT 127) and later on when it suggests 
that “it no longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument 
with which to repair the violation of justice” (ibid.). In place of resor­
ting to war, even in situations where human rights have been violated, 
Pacem in terris holds out an alternative paradigm, a paradigm based on 
a global commitment to a just political order. Of particular importance 
in this regard is the recognition that Pacem in terris fore­grounded three 
inter­related themes which gained prominence in the following decades 
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and which have become a central part of the legacy of Pacem in terris 
in terms of how it has promoted the politics of peace. These are (1) a 
re­articulation of the nature of peace as involving a commitment to a 
just international order and to human rights; (2) a focus on the role of 
international institutions as a means of resolving conflicts; (3) a highly 
critical assessment of the arms race (which the encyclical insists must 
cease, and the stock­piles of armaments reduced all round and simulta­
neously by all parties concerned) and the policy of deterrence, which is 
vociferously condemned (cf. ibid. 109 – 116).
The legacy of Pacem in terris will be further enhanced when the link 
between the politics of human rights and the politics of peace is more 
firmly established in Catholic social ethics. Pacem in terris clearly artic­
ulated this connectivity between human rights and the politics of peace, 
and insisted that peace on earth would be secured, not through the 
stock­piling of weapons, or through recourse to war, but only through 
the promotion of a juridical and political ordering of the world com­
munity, based in the recognition of the personal dignity of every human 
being (cf. ibid. 145). In this way the encyclical was clear that one of the 
premier ways of mitigating conflict was to ensure that all have access to 
the material resources necessary for authentic human development. This 
theme was taken up enthusiastically by Paul VI, especially in addresses 
on World Day of Peace. Paul VI insisted on the essential link between 
justice and peace and spoke consistently about the obligations of politi­
cal authorities to ensure a just and equitable economic order. Later still 
Pope John Paul II was acutely aware that a genuinely peaceful society is 
premised on a just economic and political order. Recurrent themes include 
the centrality of justice and human rights, of solidarity and develop ment, 
and of reconciliation in the task of building a culture of peace.
As his papacy progressed John XXIII began to re­assert the role of 
non­violent action as a means of political change and warns about the 
seductiveness and the destructiveness of violence. As we look to the 
next decades and reflect on the enduring challenge of Pacem in terris 
one must look to the question of the use of violence in order to secure 
basic human rights, and specifically at the question of the deployment 
of military force to halt gross violations of human rights. There is no 
doubt that this is one of the most difficult issues in political ethics today, 
notwithstanding the fact that there is a broad consensus amongst ethi­
cists on the admissibility and necessity of the use of violence in order 
to achieve humanitarian outcomes. Philosophers Michael Walzer, Brian 
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Orend and Jean Bethke Elshtain and theologians David Hollenbach, 
Ken Himes and Nigel Biggar each defend versions of the just war tradi­
tion that allow it to be used to justify military interventions in sovereign 
states for the purposes of securing basic human rights and of ending 
gross violations of human rights. Moreover, the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine, adopted by the United Nations in 2005, gives the UN the 
ability to intervene militarily in the context of grave abuses of human 
rights, including genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes (cf. International Commission 2001). It is difficult to 
argue against the position which holds that in such extreme circum­
stances, the only ethical course of action is to deploy violence to resist 
evil. In these situations the political, economic, historical, humanita­
rian and ethical imperatives all converge in order to make violence seem 
compelling, necessary, valuable even inevitable. Rwanda, 1994, serves 
as a caution against any diminution of the commitment to wage war to 
achieve humanitarian ends. However, even when it is directed towards 
just ends, the use of violence radically compromises the durability of 
a culture of human rights. Moreover the ethical appeal of violence is 
only compelling because of a fundamental failure of politics, a failure to 
prioritize non­violent conflict resolution, a failure to address grievances 
(real or imagined) a failure to build a culture of respect for human rights 
(cf. Hauerwas et. al. 2005).
As we seek to build a durable culture of human rights, in the spirit 
of Pacem in terris I wish to suggest that we must push back against the 
weight of this reality and challenge the dominance of the just war para­
digm in the ethical responses of these limit situations. In particular we 
must consider why human rights advocates have accepted violence as 
a means of effecting justice and why violence has captured our ethical 
and political imaginations to such an extent that those who promote 
non­violence seem at best naive and at worst irresponsible. Indeed, even 
if the conclusion remains that, as a last resort, violence should be used 
to establish a culture of human rights, the fundamental questions about 
the nature of violence and its impact should not be by­passed. It is vital 
therefore that we are clear­sighted about the nature of the violence 
through which humanitarian interventions are pursued and that we 
attend to the particularity of the brutality of violence, even when pur­
sued to secure basic human rights. Moreover, it is essential that we can 
understand as fully as possible the multiple meanings that this violence 
carries. No doubt it is difficult for those of us who have never endured 
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physical violence to understand the havoc that violence creates. Yet those 
of us who are concerned about the ethical questions raised by the use of 
violence, particularly in situations of grave humanitarian crisis, do need 
to gain some proximity to the perspectives of those who have both expe­
rienced and perpetrated violence. Thus while prior to Pacem in terris just 
war doctrine was central, its dominance has begun to wane somewhat. 
Moreover by foregrounding the individual conscience it provided an 
impetus for the growth of Catholic peace movements and ultimately for 
the support of conscientious objection as a legitimate posture within a 
democratic state. Pacem in terris challenges the tradition to move beyond 
the logic of violence, and into a space of non­violence, and towards the 
establishment of a culture of peace by peaceful means. Pacem in terris 
allows for an inter­twining of the politics of human rights with the poli­
tics of peace and is, I suggest, one of its most powerful legacies as well 
as its most enduring challenge.
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